Introduction
It has been argued that we face a crisis of 'the society of formal work' characterized by endemic instability in the work domain (Beck 2000: 21) ; and that, at the same time, powerful neoliberal discourses are seeking to eliminate social and collective opposition to that crisis's consequences (Bourdieu 1998: 95-96) . 'Neoliberalism' is certainly a contradictory phenomenon, combining an ideology of market freedom with a practice of intensified governmental regulation (Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005) . In this article, however, we are concerned not so much with neoliberal policies as with the shift in workfocussed norms and values inscribed within neoliberalism and how the lived experience of that shift is refracted in the high-profile 'reality game', The Apprentice (its UK version). While this programme is hardly a direct reflection of contemporary work, its organization and language naturalises a particular neoliberal view of work, power and individual responsibility . Analyzing this programme can contribute to our understanding of wider 'cultures' of neoliberalism.
The crisis of the contemporary workplace involves much more than increased instability, casualization, and 'flexibilisation'. There has been a shift in the forms of power and the social bonds which hold the workplace together (Sennett 2006) . Organisations at all levels, from boards to sales forces (cf Bunting 2004: 36) , are required to respond ever more quickly to short-term demands . This tends to undermine older models of bureaucratic power, with a new type of charismatic leader emerging (cf Littler 2007) who can front continuous change. This new form of charismatic power can draw on a powerful new tool: one-way command structures enhanced by instant electronic communications, that effect a surveillance-based centralization of functions whilst generating greater employee 'participation' (Andrejevic 2004) . Whilst new forms of networking and sociality have emerged, trust between employees is reduced, and the successful employee must constantly adapt to 'change' in a corporate environment whose authority structures are regularly 'delayered', requiring the worker to handle multiples of tasks in a 'non-linear' fashion (Hardt and Negri 2005 110-111; Sennett 2006: 49) . Selfgovernance therefore in part replaces the social bonds that previously sustained corporate loyalty (Sennett 2006: 47) .
As a result, in a process very different from the crisis of 'middle-management' of an earlier generation (Carlsson 1990) , the norms of employee performance are being transformed. Not only are work/life boundaries increasingly porous (Beck 2000 , Bunting 2004 ), but 'success' becomes redefined in terms of 'the magic of "being discovered", which involves luck, self-presentation, image and finding oneself in the right place at the right time' (Yiannis Gabriel, quoted in Bunting 2004: 154) . Inevitably this creates anxieties and the resulting 'cycle of emotional dependency' (Bunting 2004: 117 ) must be translated into workable norms of 'performance', the 'deep' embodiment of corporate values and commitments within an 'overwork culture' ( Schor 1992 ) that must also be 'fun'.
It is important however to analyse what is omitted from this narrative of work as play' (Rifkin 2000: 12) 1 in order to politicize contemporary work culture and so, more widely, contribute to the project of 'defataliz [ing] neoliberalism' (Bourdieu 1998: 68 Apprentice has been so popular that a third series has been moved to the main BBC channel, BBC 1, from BBC2. 2 It is at least suggestive that the format has gained particular popularity in two countries where working hours are so high.
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The more interesting issue however is how salient The Apprentice's representations and mediations of work-related norms are for the wider cultures of neoliberalism. Our study is limited in one respect, providing a contextualized analysis of the programme's narrative form, not detailed analysis of the programme's audiences, although in this it is no different from other recent work within the governmentality tradition on media and neoliberalism. We aim however to take debates about the methodology of such analyses one stage further by foregrounding how in the Apprentice highly contentious versions of work-norms are not only represented but naturalized in the ritualized form of a 'reality'-game. By presenting the 'reality' of work and business in the form of highly structured entertainment, The Apprentice transforms the norms of the neoliberal workplace into taken-for-granted 'common sense'.
Some background
Two preliminary discussions are necessary before we can proceed to our analysis, the first theoretical and methodological, and the second contextual.
Theoretical Issues
Any attempt to read particular texts as in some way illuminating wider social and economic processes (especially those as complex as neoliberalism) faces difficult choices. Foucauldian approaches to 'governmentality' -based on Rose's argument that 'the government of work now passes through the psychological strivings of each and every individual for fulfillment' (Rose 1999: 118) are 'formed' as subjects (Butler 1997: 1-2) ? Second, is agency evacuated by the univocal explanatory logic of governmentality theory and its reduction of subjectivity to 'effect' ?
Third, through what mechanisms do general representations of work in reality TV become absorbed into wider culture? Through bypassing such issues, contemporary governmentality theory can make neoliberalism seem both 'too totalising' and 'too easy' (Grossberg and Miller 2003: 32) . Consider Rose's passing treatment in his discussion of '"advanced liberal democracies' of 'mass media' as merely 'pedagogies', one among 'a plethora of indirect mechanisms that can translate the goals of political, social, economic authorities into the choices and commitments of individuals, locating them [citizens] into actual or virtual networks of identification through which they may be governed ' (1996: 58, added emphasis). In this simple notion of 'translation', governmentality approaches apparently forget one of Foucault's most crucial insights, that processes of power are inherently unstable and always rely on people's participation in their own subjectivation (1982: 221). 4 We need to take agency seriously without romanticizing it, which means acknowledging also the spaces and places where the unsuccessful implementation of neoliberal governmentality becomes apparent, so revealing a gap between the neoliberal project and the heterogeneous responses to it, a 'governmentality gap' we revisit in our conclusion.
We therefore in our analysis step slightly to one side of governmentality theory, recognizing the force of the questions to which its applications point us , but not accepting, necessarily, all its answers. Instead, we combine this approach with the sensibility of post-Marxist discourse analysis, which enables a consideration of the specific articulations being made in relation to a particular formation of capitalism, whilst avoiding crudely totalizing accounts of culture and society (Hall, 1997) . In addition, we advance our analysis in a somewhat different direction by drawing on Nick Couldry's recent work on reality-based media as 'media rituals' (Couldry 2003: chapter 7 , which argues such formats [ ] naturalise the authority of 'the media' as 'our' privileged accesspoint into the constructed totality of 'the social' and its 'reality'. This in turn, we suggest, enables us to see particular media 'reality' games as ways of naturalizing particular norms (here versions of the contemporary shift in work norms) within a format that is ambiguously offered as 'just a game', yet at the same time providing insights into underlying social reality. Games such as the Apprentice as ideological not through the specific statements they make, but through their privileged enactment of particular norms. 
The rough and the smooth: The Apprentice and chaotic capitalism
Our starting-point here is that, whilst the neoliberal imperative of rolling back state provision and increasing corporate power is not, globally, either a uniform or even process, it is noteworthy that the US and Britain -where The Apprentice has had such audience success -aggressively endorse these trends in contrast with the more ambivalent or reticent politics of other countries: for instance, countries in which a form of social democratic capitalism is more heavily rooted (Sweden, the Netherlands) or where oppositional tactics are prominent (Venezuela and Ecuador) (Brenner 2006; Harvey 2003) . The particular contemporary Anglo-American formation of neoliberal corporate capitalism is one which is simultaneously marked by polish and precariousness. The increased power of the financial industries -accumulated thorough asset-stripping, risk assessment, financial gambling and the work of 'vulture capitalists' -and the increasing exploitation of employees and the exacerbation of consumer debt have developed alongside 'a surge in upscale real-estate prices and the turnover of the luxury goods sector' alongside (Blackburn 2006: 69-70 ; see also Brenner, 2006 , Leys 2001 . As Nigel Thrift puts it, this operates as a kind of cultural and political 'squeeze' in which capitalism is pointed in two entirely opposed and closely linked directions, combining trends 'often very close to barbarism with an increasingly sophisticated corporate vanguard' (Thrift 2006: 280) . This juxtaposition, Thrift points out, looks increasingly discrepant, desperate and bizarre: while a considerable area of the globe is ravaged by primitive accumulation -by force and enclosure -the US/UK's glossy corporatism seeks to 'activate germs of talent' in increasingly sophisticated ways (Thrift 2006: 283) . Mayfair property portfolio' (and it is notable that Trump has made most of his money through real estate). The fact that there are no safety nets for contestants on the programme is constantly emphasized; indeed, the risk of being cast aside is turned into a source of dramatic excitement and tension ('You're fired!'). (In the Finnish one-off version of The Apprentice, the slogan is by contrast 'you're free to leave', nicely hinting at both social democratic respect and neoliberal individualism). 7 Such tactics dramatise, in heightened form, the current conventions of workplace ranking from performancerelated pay to regularised institutional sackings (Enron famously has a 'rank and yank' policy under which 15% of its employees were fired each year: Gibney, 2006) . programme's crash course in working on their working selves (Dean 1999 ). In Episode 6, for instance, after Sir Alan has told the contestants they will be selling used cars, the voiceover tells us 'there's only a few hours to learn about it…So it's straight into the classroom to learn how to catch a customer'. In a typical episode, there is a short lecture followed by the experiential learning of the task, then extensive feedback and reflection 
How The Apprentice presents 'the social'
In this section, we look at how the UK version of The Apprentice presents the social world of work. In these terms, the contrast with the US programme is here quite striking, as the norms of interpersonal aggression are presented with so little disguise in the UK programme. Before we look at the detail, it is worth noting one contextual factor, which the fact that you've won all the tasks doesn't mean jack shit to me because I haven't talked with you yet. So you speak to me now, you speak to me now, because, I'm telling you, it's getting close to that door [pointing at the exit door].
Good work within a group, it is implied, counts for nothing at all beside the ability to satisfy Sir Alan in direct confrontation. This is a picture of the social dynamics of the workplace in which respect for [ ] team dynamics is inconsequential, and all that matters is individual combat with the chief executive on his own terms, Sir Alan in the boardroom.
Charismatic Power
Implied here also, in the programme's highly individualized portrayal of work-based sociality, is an exclusively charismatic model of power. 10 It is charisma that does not even adopt a guise of routine rationality. The charismatic basis of this power is never masked, and Sir Alan loses no opportunity to defeat contestants in verbal combat. This is (Useem 1984 : 172-196) whilst Sugar is self-proclaimed hero of the 'meritocratic' age.
While both series are, of course, organized around the affirmation of power, Trump's power is therefore closer to the routinised charisma (Weber 1991) of the established corporate world, whereas Sugar's power remains purely charismatic, and so must be continuously defended against personal challenge.
Some consequences follow from this for the UK show. First, all power relationships are shown in personal terms. While Sir Alan has his court of trusted advisers and interviewers, he emphasises that the final decisions will always be his, and his alone: as he puts it, in the final episode 'my instinct is telling me . . .'. We note in passing that this purely personalized version of decision-making bears some resemblance to George W.
Bush's reputed reliance on 'instinct', even when making the most complex strategic decisions (Danner 2006: 87 Indeed, the limitations of narrow approaches to governmentality -for all the useful questions to which they alert us -emerge readily when we compare The Apprentice to the UK 'mockumentary' sitcom The Office, which portrayed the working relationships between a group of colleagues in a company in Slough and was also very successful in the US (BBC, 2001) . A large source of the humour of the programme -why it is both funny and resonant -is because it dramatizes the failure of such modes of governmentality. In The Office, the idea of being empowered through corporate logic doesn't ring true: on the contrary, entrepreneurial self-realisation and the language of business empowerment -particularly as spouted by the lead character and key figure of ridicule, David Brent -is shown to be flagrantly laughable (even if other more 'successful' models of management practice lurk in the background). Neoliberal corporate working discourse is shown to stunt the possibilities of lives, both emotionally and practically, and to be used for banal and narrow ends (i.e. producing profit for a Slough stationary company). As Paul Gilroy puts it, The Office was 'the one vital, dynamic place in all of British culture where the language and practice of managerialism were held up to ridicule and the routinization of insecure employment was judged to be immoral and unjust' (Gilroy 2004: 150) . The comedy demonstrated that processes of governmentality are not always or necessarily smoothly implemented, precisely the 'governmentality gap' we referred to earlier.
If governmentality (properly understood) still allows for participation and agency, it remains for us to clarify how the reality TV format works to aid the closing down the cultural space of oppositional agency. Mark Andrejevic has persuasively argued that reality TV in general is a sphere in which 'the participation of consumers in the rationalization of their own consumption is sold as empowerment' (Andrejevic 2004:15) .
In The Apprentice, as we have shown, this focus is re-tooled towards labour -it becomes a site where the participation of workers in the rationalization of their own work is sold as empowerment (for both viewer and contestant). The programme educates its viewers (in dramatized form) in how to become 'empowered' by struggling within and reproducing the norms of a harsh, unpredictable, precarious, increasingly competitive working climate. As a result, the highly distinctive performance norms of neoliberal business culture are themselves naturalized and objectified as part of 'the real world out there'. It is here definitively, perhaps, that the iron cage of modernity becomes fully imaginable as the surveillance-enabled 'glass cage' (Gabriel 2003) 
